As my title
says, what strikes me most about dialog is that it lies at the intersection of
theoretical and practical area, to spell it in Kantian words. We may even say
that it appears as a kind of magical key or tool for both orders: it has been
thought and still may be sustained that dialog defines the only way or the best
way towards truth; there are people who judge that maintaining the conditions
for dialog is what ethics are about, or who conceive of dialog as the right
path towards valid norms. What Kant himself meant to locate ÒbetweenÓ all the
districts of philosophy, as a kind of common term, was rather reason: it could
be that bestowing such a function to dialog instead of reason characterizes
contemporary mind or debate.
So, my
first goal will be to understand a little better dialogÕs role and function
both in the theoretical and the practical context.
Well, we
should begin the story with Plato, I guess. Being not a specialist, IÕm not
well equipped to deal with the subject. Still, I may dare some remarks, hoping
the corresponding points to be uncontroversial.
Dialog has
a methodological weight in PlatoÕs philosophy. Dialog should be the living
spoken one, and not the written one, in contradiction to what Plato as a matter
of fact did. In the living dialog, every speech act comes with his authorÕs
thoughtÕs warrant: the one who uttered something stands behind it and is able
to rescue it, to bring any kind of strengthening to it, in order to avoid it to
be criticized or wrongly understood. This property of living Platonic dialog
was underlined by Levinas.
Dialog is
the right path in the research of truth, at least if we are able to admit of
the thing in itself as our referee or our judge: if we do not so much speak to
each other being concerned of our addressee at every step, but call for each
otherÕs testimony about some shared object. When dialog really internalizes
itself between its two partners, it does it at the risk of becoming persuasion,
forgetting about truth.
Dialog has
a rhythm which suits to the research of truth, but this rhythm has nothing to
do with address: it corresponds with iteration of dichotomy.
Dialog is
the preferred tool towards truth, but this does not mean that dialog is
symmetrical.
Dialog may
consist in someone extracting from someone this eternal truth she bears in
herself. This typically happens during the ÒmathÕs lessonÓ. The mathÕs teacher,
as we see in the Meno, asks questions to his pupil,
the young slave, to the effect that he brings him to the same level of
anamnesis he already enjoys. Therefore, it is very difficult how dialog could
help deepening anamnesis: the best it can favor is equalizing anamnesis between
subjects. And for the same reason, historical progress of mathematics as
anamnesis science does not seem to may find resources in dialog.
In other
cases, dialog may be the technical device thanks to which a master leads the
weaker minds of his pupils to some shared conception, using them as supportive
answerers before including them in the ÒweÓ of the conquered intellection: it
happens so in Laws, X, as Lyotard
commented it once.
In the
whole, I would say that dialog does not clearly count as dialog in the strong
sense in PlatoÕs conception. The function of dialog does not mean that there is
some extraordinary value of my being ÒwithÓ the other person through dialog.
Dialog is a methodological device, but it has to be converted into dialog about
the real object – which amounts to a new discipline – and
it appears more as a structural framework for conceptual journey than as the
basic Òintersubjective cellÓ.
Behaving
like a German idealist philosopher, I jump from the Greeks (among which I
neglected Aristoteles) to Kant.
First,
having already Hegel in mind, we may consider KantÕs famous antithetic of pure
reason. Should it really be regarded as a dialog? IÕm not sure of that. To be
sure, a kind of dialogical form gets exhibited, as far as the antithesis is
supposed to answer the thesis. One would like to say that they built together a
dialogical loop, indefinitely answering each other. But Kant does not picture
things like that. Antithesis and thesis install together the paradoxical node
at once, insofar as they are labeled by P and ¯P. There is no attempt in the text
to bring to the fore any dialogical dynamic which would address us from the
thesis to the antithesis and vice versa. What I have just described is what
indeed happens with the famous Liar, but not here with antithetic of pure
reason.
Also to be
remembered, because of the future, is the table
structure which is given by Kant to his very short dialog, consisting only
in the three steps 1) P ; 2) ¯P ; 3) Paradox. Kant wants to write the
thesis on the left, and the antithesis on the right, in such a way that the
resulting paradox appears as ÒsaidÓ by the mere
juxtaposition of the two columns of the table.
But we
should also, I guess, think of another Kantian topos: the three maxims of common
sense, appearing in the third Critique. As one remembers, these three maxims
ask us to think by ourselves, to think having tried the otherÕs position, and
to think coherently. Such kind of thinking, obeying the three maxims, is likely
to promote sensus communis, a common
way of feeling the world and conceiving of it. We find no explicit reference to
dialog in these maxims, neither any indication that Kant would consider sensus communis as arising through
dialog: such a view looks more like a contemporary import. Still the second
maxim introduces some regard for the other person in the picture: but how could
we measure our transposition attempts without dialog? Does this maxim not
already presupposes that we have some reciprocity
ability which cannot be grounded in anything but dialog? If so much is true,
then dialog appears as a hidden condition of sensus communis, even if sensus
communis is formulated as a shared regulation of the relationship towards
World or Nature, not involving the I-The other person relationship.
Now comes
the morceau de bravoure: this general setting for rationality
which we call Dialectics after Hegel, forgetting in a rather unfair way
other uses of the expression (even Kantian Òtranscendental dialecticÓ is sent
into the shadow by HegelÕs triumph). This impressive success achieves a kind of
reshaping of the expressionÕs semantics: after Hegel, we do not conceive
dialectics as referring to human dialog; we only retain some kind of rhythm,
better said of logical/ontological rhythm, not even necessarily related to
language. Dialectics names a mode of move, or better the basic cell from which
every kind of move arises, the scheme standing in genetic position towards
becoming in general, without distinguishing itself from it: dialectics is becoming, and the key or the core of
becoming at the same time. Dialectics is simultaneously temporal, logical and
ontological. Being assumes the assertive form of P, but such assumption already
involves the assertion of ¯P, both calling for an overcoming Q,
richer and enfolding P as well as ¯P. This structure accounts for the
passing of time (future is the byproduct of Aufhebung, past is what
dialectics looks at back). This structure uses logic,
it takes advantage of the strength and universality of contradiction (and then
dissolves it). This structure, ultimately, is the deepest structure of Being,
Being is nothing but Becoming, which is nothing but
Dialectics.
At one
level, all of this has nothing to do with Dialog, but at another level, it gets
its name from Dialog and has to be read remembering Dialog. Dialectics teaches
that the fundamental move of Being takes a dialogical form. We may thing Being
as objecting to itself and overcoming its internal debate, such a dialogical
narrative standing for the core of Being, Logic and Time. Encapsulated in the
dialectical scheme, we find several most important ÒgeneralizationsÓ of Dialog:
not only Dialog may be Dialog of human person with Nature, but Dialog
ultimately can be predicated of the relation of Nature to itself; and this also
means that we are called to think of the transition from one instant to some
future one in a dialogical way, time unfolds itself in a dialogical way;
finally, negation should not be conceived of in a limited way as sentence
relative, negation concerns every kind of position arising amidst Being.
All of this
generalized lexicon has been assimilated by continental philosophy. Its
consequences, as we perhaps do not underline it usually, run in two directions.
On one hand, such lexicon encourages us to forget about Dialog, thinking in
terms of Dialog what seems not to deserve it. Typically, we name Dialog and
think as Dialog the epistemic relation of human kind to nature. Even more, we
are ready to interpret any becoming, or ultimately the passing of time itself,
as the expression of a kind of self-dialog. Such conceptions arise in a lot of
writings, not only Hegelian ones. But on the other hand, this language may
induce us to really think in terms of Dialog beyond the frontier of dialog in
the narrow or strict sense of inter-human talk. Buber insists that Dialog has
to connect the I
with some not fake Thou. Because of
the philosophical weigh he bestows to his Thou
concept, it seems that Dialog is supposed to be relation to the irreducible, to
the resisting Other as such. Nevertheless, in BuberÕs
conception the Thou may be Nature
(associated with its mystery, as poetry sings it), and the best case for the Thou, maybe, is God: Buber takes
advantage of Hegelian facility. But it can be argued that when he does it, the
requirements of the notion of Dialog are not erased, on the contrary they get
awakened by the very gesture of generalizing the wordÕs use.
To finish
with this section, we may legitimately say that, from a Hegelian perspective,
Dialog counts as an obligatory way towards truth, in following sense: Dialog is
analyzed as the substance of Being as ongoing Being, therefore knowledge, in
order to correspond to Being, has to be in some way dialogical. We know how
discourse makes itself dialogical in HegelÕs sense: by taking up dialectical
rhythm, which means never tolerating any rest in the ÒunilateralÓ truth, but
always jumping to the other side of totality, this in turn happening only
thanks to the logic of contradiction. The philosopher really seeking for truth
has to listen to any finite judgment well enough to hear its negation arising
from it, and to accompany the Aufhebung which determines itself as negation of negation:
but these steps have under Hegelian eyes the character of a dialog. The correct
way of letting ¯P arise from P is to welcome it as a
kind of answer of P to itself. And this was, maybe, the deep reason for calling
dialectic the new logic. Dialectic is nothing but the internalization and ontologization of dialogical move. Hegel confesses in his
very particular way that thought never really moves when not advocated within
Dialog.
I now come
to a more recent way of taking very seriously the function of dialog within
rationality: the ÒanalyticalÓ one, which claims to recover all philosophical
stakes at the level of logic. I shall evoke here only two kind of works, quite
different from each other, even if they can be related: what is called
Òdialogical logicÓ on one hand, thinking above all of Shahid
RahmanÕs work, and the well known Òlogic of
conversationÓ of Grice on the other hand. Somewhere between the two sources or
trends, we should also consider HintikkaÕs work,
because it crosses in some sense both: but we wonÕt here, at least not in a
significant way.
I begin
with Òdialogical logicÓ. It may be described as a way to account for logical
validity. For example, we define in classical predicate logic exceptional
formulas which are, semantically considered, satisfied under any interpretation
in any structure, or, which are, syntactically considered, derivable from some
basic logical axioms following some straightforward inference rules ; or
again, which may be proved in the system of natural deduction. These
exceptional formulas are the valid ones, or the universally valid ones, or
predicate calculusÕs theorems: GšdelÕs completeness theorem warrants that each
of these denominations names the same formulas. Dialogical logic would then be
an alternative formal method for singling out these formulas. For every formula
X applying for logical validity, we imagine a dialog, between a proponent (P)
and an opponent (O). P asserts X towards O, and initiates in that way a
dialogical game, where the opponent is going to attack X in every possible way,
and P will defend it also in every possible way, both according to some
specific rules telling exactly how something is supposed to be attacked or
defended. In this strange dialog, each protagonist only utters formulas, and
each time, as an attack of a by the other previously uttered formula, or as a
defense of a by the other previously attached formula. When P utters some
formula, he claims it to be true. When O utters some formula, he concedes it to
be true, challenging P to establish that the original
formula is true granted the just uttered formula is. The game finishes when one
of the player cannot do any new move, in which case this player has lost the
game. The rules of this dialog game are such that X is indeed logically valid
exactly when P has a winning strategy against O, starting the game with X as we
said.
At first
sight, the dialog game, as a tool for checking formulas validity, looks as very
similar to BethÕs method of semantic tables, as Hintikka observes it. But, as
Hintikka again points, justifying X with Beth tables it is at the same time
very akin to formally proving X (one only has to read the semantic tables in
the reverse way). So after all, we would be tempted to estimate dialog games as
not really dialogical. There is no real dialog in them, because P and O are not
two genuine persons, they are just labels for a drawing or presentation device
(like in KantÕs transcendental dialectic, what we are facing is tables rather than dialogs). Or, if we take seriously HintikkaÕs
commentary on these semantic games, P stands for ÒMyselfÓ and O for ÒNatureÓ,
at least when the game is a real Òoutdoor gameÓ in which we try to check whether
some statement in true in the actual world (but we have to keep this reading in
mind when we play the indoor game of checking universal validity: the only
difference is that Nature in that case only speaks at the level of its most
general structures). Therefore, dialogical logic appears to be only dialogic in
the shifted generalized meaning introduced by Hegel: this would not make it
likable for Russell.
But may be,
we have not been fair with dialogical logic. When we look more carefully at
some of Shahid RahmanÕs
recent results, the picture changes. As a matter of fact, it appears that one
can characterize some more or less ÔnonstandardÕ logics in dialogical terms: it
is enough to introduce one specific rule on dialogs to make the underlying
logic intuitionist, free, or even paraconsistent. We
get the force of intuitionist rejection of excluded middle simply by forbidding
any player to answer any other attack than the most recent opened one. In order
to enjoy a free logic, where a logical constant may not refer to any actual
individual, allowing for fictional discourse, we just have to decide that only
the opponent O is allowed to introduce a logical constant in the dialog: the
meaning of this rule is that logical constants involved in the original formula
declared by the proponent may not be used as logical cases in the debate: they
are not known to be names of actual individuals, only the constants introduced
by the opponent have this status. Shahid Rahman, in his paper Ç On FregeÕs
Nightmare È,
designs a dialogical rule such that the underlying logic would be
at the same time intuitionist, free and paraconsistent,
which explains for the title of the paper.
It seems
that after all, dialogical logic has something genuinely dialogical in itself:
rational forms are translated into Òpositional rulesÓ, rules that break the
symmetry between the two players of the dialog-game, or Òtemporal rulesÓ referring
to dialogÕs rhythm. But the very possibility of such dissymmetry belongs to
dialog in an essential way, at least if we understand it rightly. We are
accustomed to understand reciprocity as the major property of dialog. We could
be wrong: the first basic rule of dialog, the one which applies to me as well
as to my addressee, and whose observance is an imperative condition for dialog
to hold, is that I know my position not to be my addresseeÕs one: that I
understand his ÒmineÓ not to have the same meaning as mine, for example, or
that I donÕt recognize myself as designated when he utters ÒIÓ.
In that
spirit, fictional discourse is understood by dialogical logic as expressing my
respect for Nature as an addressee: I do not deal with individuals whose names
I freely included in my claims as if Nature had introduced them in its dialog
with me. In classical empirical thought, Nature introduces an individual when
it gives it to me in sensitive perception. Transcendental philosophies object
that this indeed never happens. Then we should probably only distinguish
between levels of dialogs, each one being connected with a range of background
acknowledged individuals. I do not go further in such an attempt to reformulate
in dialogical terms the classical debate of philosophy of knowledge. We have
seen at least that dialogical insights may be relevant and useful in order to
understand some very deep and fundamental features of rational enterprise.
I now evoke
GriceÕs conceptions, which are representative of a quite different reflection.
What Grice tries to convince us of, indeed, is rather that the finality of
dialog is responsible for a kind of Òsecond strataÓ in the meaning process,
which goes beyond the level of conventionalized meaning, and could be the most
important one in ordinary speech exchange. We are usually understanding
sentences, or more generally linguistic phrases, through what Grice calls implicatures: we
are reaching another meaning level by taking into account conversationÕs
finality, and deducing this second meaning from the first level conventional
meaning. In GriceÕs words, something is meant
via (awaited) implicature which was
not said. Let us quote one of GriceÕs
funny examples. In the dialog
Ç A: Smith doesnÕt seem to have
a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately È[1],
B
implicates that A sees a girlfriend in New York, although he does not say it.
Well, is that politically correct enough for North America? At least, it suits
very well for an European. We may reach this
underlying meaning by making use of the conversational maxim ÒBe relevantÓ: B
would not evoke theses visits of Smith without the intention of saying
something about the topic, SmithÕs sexual or sentimental life.
Grice
enumerates a collection of rules which are supposed to govern conversation as a
collective process. All theses rules follow from the Cooperative Principle: Ç Make your conversational contribution
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged È[2]. Grice particularizes this
principle according to each of the four Kantian category titles, coming to more
precise rules like Ç Do not say what you believe to be false È, Ç Avoid
obscurity of expression È or Ç Make your contribution as informative as
required È.
When one
reads GriceÕs various examples, one gets the feeling that he tries to absorb
all kind of ÒcontextualÓ meaning effect with his implicature notion. So his
conceptual setting reminds us other distinctions, like the old
Òdenotation/connotationÓ one. The Cooperative
Principle and the conversational maxims it yields, do the job of accounting
for the impossibility of defining meaning in a syntactical and semantic
univocal way: each time it may be alleged that linguistic expressions signify
differently than would be according to some systematic meaning computation, we
should explain it at the level of some at least putative conversation, where
the resulting meaning becomes deducible from the conversational maxims, granted
we now enough from the circumstances.
Such
analyzes have the advantage of leaving unchallenged, and in its limited way
perfectly valid, the first level of conventional meaning. In the background,
there is no doubt that Grice enters an implicit debate with the fundamental
contention of analytical philosophy in general: that meaning of sentences
resides in their truth conditions. Quite characteristic is the way Grice deals
with the meaning of the syntactical pattern Ò If É,
then ÉÓ. It has been often sustained that the logical translation of ÒIf P then
QÓ by P¨Q was in most cases false: usually,
when we say ÒIf P then QÓ, we do not mean that the truth conditions for the
material conditional P¨Q obtain, but rather that there is
some a priori connection between P
and Q which justifies the expectation that Q is the case in case P is. But
Grice maintains that at some primary level, ÒIf P then QÓ exactly means that
the truth conditions of P¨Q obtain. We only reach the other
interpretation through the maxim Ç Make your contribution as informative as
required È: the utterer cannot now that ¯P or that Q, the two possible truth
justifications for P¨Q, because if he would, he would
have rather uttered them, in application of the maxim. So most likely he utters
ÒIf P then QÓ because he only knows some a
priori connection of the just specified kind. GriceÕs analysis, in such
case, seems to protect the classical dogmatic logical reading of language.
Dialog will be the only culprit for meaning not to be the exact machinery hoped
by Frege and Russell, and which people like Montague
or Kamp have tried to design.
A second
important point, for the present paper, is connected with the proposition of
the Cooperative Principle itself.
Apparently, to obey Cooperative Principle
does not amount to admit of truth of the only relevant goal, it does not
condemn every dialog to be a theoretical one. Still, most of GriceÕs maxims
seem to assume such a theoretical goal (as the ones we quoted above). But in
any case, there is a big problem in postulating cooperation as a principle for
any dialog: we feel that many dialogs are rather dispute-driven. Could Grice
argue that some cooperation is needed even in order to keep the dispute
topically going on? I think this would not be a serious escape of the
difficulty. We only adopt a restricted notion of dispute if we think of dispute
always as some kind of framed and controlled development, calling for
cooperative support from each part at each step. Human conversation shows very
likely more digressive disputes, where each partner escapes, deceives, shakes
or attacks the other, making to that effect great use of topical move. J.F. Lyotard was descriptively more convincing when evoking
dispute as a kind of divergence principle for any dialog: both partners, in
many cases, conflict about what can count as ÒwinÓ for the sequence of
exchanges phrases, in such a way that they do not refer to the same finality.
This point
is of some importance for one who wants to deal with dialogÕs foudational significance with respect to ethics. But it
already bothers a conception like GriceÕs one which identifies to quickly
dialog with something like the scientific search for truth.
We also
find in Grice a quite different orientation. He seems to be tempted to redefine
every meaning in terms of dialog (instead of keeping the opposition between
conventional linguistic meaning and implicature meaning). First, he spends a
lot of effort in an attempt to define ÒU
meant something by uttering xÓ, in
which x, that U utters, in not necessary a linguistic performance, a phrase. But
he then outlines as a sensible program the program of reducing what he calls
Òtimeless meaningÓ of linguistics performances to some occasional notion of Òmeaning by uttering that xÓ. He goes
in that direction as far as trying to account for referential use of nouns.
Grice sees very well that in his enterprise he takes psychological attitudes,
like intentions, beliefs, and so on, as part of what underlies meaning. And he
is aware that this goes beyond classical extensionalist
conception of meaning, as we already evoked it. In GriceÕs words:
Ç I will hardly have escaped
notice that my account of the cluster of notions connected with the term
ÒmeaningÓ has been studded with expressions for such intensional
concepts as those of intending an believing (É).
Second, I said at one point that intensionality
seems to be embedded in the very foundations of the theory of language
(É) È[3].
But this ÒintensionalÓ strata, in GriceÕs
case, is connected with dialog: intentions are typically intentions to transmit
to the addressee some believes or intentions. Propositional attitudes are
considered in the context of dialogical game, through whose moves they jump
from some dialog-partner to the other one.
So we meet
with Grice another ambition concerning dialog: dialog appears not so much as
the methodological path towards truth, but as the relevant world for
psychological attitudes adventures which ground any possible meaning. Dialog
plays the major part in the philosophical grounding of meaning. Meaning has to
be analyzed and understood as transmitted within dialog, and in relation with
what we could call Òdialog intentionsÓ.
This new
foundational status for dialog, I guess, stands between the theoretical and the
practical. The meaning issue – as always already
dialogical – is at the same time theoretical, because any possible
knowledge content will have to be uttered and communicated according to the
general conditions of meaning, and practical, because meaningÕs transmission
includes much of what we usually consider as behavior with respect to the other
person.
But let us
now turn to this ÒethicalÓ problematic of dialog.
I first
want to evoke here, in a brief and unspecialized manner, HabermasÕs
motive of an Òethics of discussionÓ.
Well, I
think HabermasÕs basic claim is rather well known. We
have to take up, following him, KantÕs view that possible universalization
is the right criterion for morality, but Kant was wrong in trying to locate
such a criterion in some principle, associated with some explicit sentence or
text (of the categorical imperative). Any such principle becomes weak under
skeptical suspicion. But we can recover its wisdom at the pragmatic level of
unavoidable rules for discussion. Any skeptical attack has to enter the area of
debate, and of Òfair debateÓ even. So there are rules governing any possible
discussion as far as it is not imprisoned from the beginning inside some
restricted moral conceptions or worldÕs picture, rules to which we always
already have committed ourselves. They correspond to a level of shared
rationality that we cannot deny or reject. They include the unacceptability of
the exclusion of any qualified protagonist in the ongoing discussion, and in
that way they entail that a ÒconclusionÓ for the debate about what should be
kept as social norm will have to be such that any rational subject would be
able to want such norm.
To be more
explicit, I enclose here a summary of the Òdialog ruleÓ, as formulated by P. Alexy (he calls them Òargumentative presuppositionsÓ, which
fits to the just outlined conception of these rules):
Group 1
1.1 No
speaker is allowed to contradict himself.
1.2 Every
speaker who applies predicate F to
object a should
be ready to also apply F to any
object b which in every relevant
aspect is like a.
1.3 Two different speaker are not allowed to use the same linguistic
expression under two different meanings.
Group 2
2.1 Every
speaker may only assert what he himself believes to be true.
2.2 Anyone
who challenges some statement outside of the discussionÕs scope should give his
reasons for that.
Group 3
3.1 Every
subject able to speak and to act has to be able to take part to the discussion.
3.2 a. Everyone has to be allowed to question whichever statement
he wishes to.
3.2.b. Everyone has to be allowed to import into the discussion
whichever statement he wishes.
3.2.c. Everyone should be allowed to express his views, his desires
and his needs.
3.3 No
speaker should be blocked by any authoritarian pressure to make use of his
rights as defined by 3.1and 3.2.
Put
together, these Òpragmatic rulesÓ are supposed to shape a good dialogical
space, securing that truth concerning the facts will be searched in a correct way
(first group), that speakers will be authentic and will stick to the point
(second group), and that no a priori dissymmetry will alter the possible
outcome of discussion (third group).
The
question we may raise here, taking for granted that such discussion rules would
indeed warrant the ethical content of discussionÕs outcome, is whether the
imagined scenario for choosing the right norms makes dialog the crucial origin
of ethics.
It is very
difficult not to think that all these rules witness for the possibility of
dialog to violate rationality, authenticity and ethics (depending on which
group of rules gets infringed) : their very
formulation confess the contingency of their observance. I understand that
philosophers like Habermas do not see it in that way:
for them, when we disobey such rules, what we are taking part to stops being
dialog properly understood. HabermasÕs contention,
then, is that all our ideal measures concerning truth, good and authenticity
are already encapsulated in the ideal measure of dialog. And that we experience
this ideal measure as something we continue to pragmatically rely on (to feel
as having to be respected within our dialogs) even when we favor statements
thematically contradicting them (skeptical statements, for example).
But still,
the requirements concerning dialog whose list was just given do not essentially
proceed from some deep feature of dialog as such. Or at least, HabermasÕs explanation does not seem to me to illuminate
them in such a way. We are not explained why dissymmetrical talks, manipulative
discussions, or uncoherent discourse strategy in
dialogs contradict the core of what dialog should be. Therefore, I have the
feeling that Habermas, less radically, only
designates dialog as the basic experience locus for any ideal measure. Which
indeed attributes a mostly important role to dialog with respect to ethics (and
also to rationality), but not as we were imagining.
If we try
to dig a little more, maybe we will have to say that dialog provides for such
an experience locus because our ideal measures are fundamentally collective.
They draw their value from our sharing them: therefore, we meet them with their
unescapable meaning and strength when we face the
others in our discussions. We become responsible for them and aware of them as
soon as we are in position effectively to share them. In KantsÕs
view (or at least in vulgar KantÕs view) all the normative content concerning
possible judgments (which is called transcendental content) comes to be felt
and known in reflection, with imaginationÕs help perhaps. Habermas
simply wants us to relate to the same transcendental content in a more external
way, in the context of dialogs. But this does not lead him to question dialog
as such. Or to put in differently, dialog counts only as a given form of the
collective as opposed to the personal-subjective. It is for sure, very
important, that dialog appears as the original cell of any collective reality. I
ignore if HabermasÕs philosophy highlights that point.
Continuing
to reflect on dialogÕs relevance with respect to ethics, I shall now consider
the possible teaching of Talmudic tradition. My analysis will be based on one
chapter of Georges HanselÕs recent book De
la Bible au Talmud, called Ç La controverse talmudique :
dŽcadence ou progression È[4].
The whole
chapter comments on this sentence of the Erouvin treatise which is
attributed to a Ç heavenly voice È, and which puts an end to the
controversy about Jewish law having opposed during three years the Chamma• and the Hillel school :
Ç les paroles des uns et des autres sont les paroles du Dieu vivant È [the words of each of them
are words of the living God].
As it is
well known, the law nevertheless is taken to be as HillelÕs school was teaching it. So the Talmud invents here, at the
level of the principle, a way of dealing with internal controversy, between
masters of the Jewish ethical science of law (ÔhohÕma): even when such controversies
are decided in favor of one or of the other, the position of the minority is
kept as part of the truth, at a kind of surprising equal rank with the winning
one.
Georges
Hansel explains how we should understand this principle, what it means with
respect to the controversy itself. It is then a natural question to ask whether
the principle also enfolds some conception concerning dialog.
The first
way to interpret the principle is to understand it as insisting on a deep
unity, underlying the various confronting ideas or positions: each of them
expresses some face of reality, or maybe some in itself legitimate subjective
approach of the same reality. This understanding of the principle is best
explained by the Maharal, whom Georges Hansel quotes.
The law has to be decided in some way, because it has to be one: what this decision does is to
select some aspect or some perspective who are or
should be prevailing under normal circumstances. But it is always possible that
in some new circumstances, the judgment about what prevails should change,
bestowing effective authority to some until then rejected view (Georges Hansel
quotes here Rachi
and the Edouiot
treatise).
Do we find
here some way of valuing dialog (in the specific form of the controversy) in
itself? I do not feel sure of this. What shows here essential is that we have
at disposal many views, but not, as far as I understand it, that they arise in
the context of dialog. For sure, it is mentioned as a possible ground for the
arousal of the diverse views that they originate in the diverse personalities
of the diverse masters. But would each one work alone on the side of himself, without entering dialog, the result would be the
same. We certainly need a judgment taking every proposal into account: but
here, the relevant form is the collective democratic debate, ruled by the
majority principle, and not dialog as living dual exchange of meaning. Still, we
have the memory of the Chamma•-Hillel case, where it
seems that such kind of dialog occurred. Or was it only a war, each school
sending its conclusion to the other, and no dual dynamic governing the very
constitution of each position?
I do not
try to resume here all the interpretations which Georges Hansel evokes. I
immediately come to the last one, because it definitely concerns dialog.
Georges Hansel tells the story of Rabi Yohanan and Rech Laqich. The second one was a mighty burglar, when Rabi Yohanan met him and convinced him to become a Talmudic master instead. Rech Laqich used to quarrel with Rabi Yohanan his friend about law points. But then Rech Laqich dies, to the effect that Rabi Yohanan is very sad and lacks him. The community tries to give him Rabbi Eleizer ben Pedat as a new sparring partner. But Rabi Eliezer only finds references supporting Rabi YohananÕs views. Rabi Yohanan therefore complains:
Ç CÕest toi qui remplaces Rech Laqich ?
Rech Laqich, quand
je disais quelque chose, me faisait 24 objections, je lui faisais 24 rŽponses
et ainsi lÕŽtude Žtait fŽconde et progressait È [ Ç Are
yo the one who is supposed to take Rech LaqichÕs place? Rech
Laqich, when I said
something, used to object in 24 ways, and I replied by 24 answers, and in that
way study was fruitful and making progress È]
Here, we
clearly see that dialog is valued for itself, although only in the very
specific form of the rational quarrel.
This
particular kind of truth which is sought for in Talmudic tradition, a truth at
the same time theoretical and ethical, is meant to be easier, or better, or
more likely reached if searchers take benefit of the
Òobjection/counter-objectionÓ structure. Which, for sure, is what many people
think in a lot of intellectual disciplines, to begin with, in scientific ones.
But the
story also tells that such confronting may have a dramatic impact on persons.
When your partner attacks your thought, you may suffer deeply, and there is a
risk that friendship, and the possibility of working and living together, gets
lost. Still, we should undertake dialog, for the sake of the better truth,
useful to the whole community.
One could
ask why rational war helps? Is it so clear that it helps imagining and
formulating the best opinions that each one gets attacked by
someone?
The natural
answer would be that the best opinion is the one that anticipates and enfolds
the richest content. And dialog brings to me, as the content of my adversaryÕs
talk, any content I could have neglected, any apparently bad case for my universal
statement I have to cope with in order to make it stronger.
I see a
kind of tension, here, between two understandings of the relevance of dialog.
On one
hand, it is possible to regard the addressee as necessary because he plays the
role of the Opponent in dialogical
logic. He is a kind of logical employee who logically verifies my statements by
objecting everything that can be objected according to logical rules. That is
indeed very useful, but it is not completely absurd to think that I could play
the part of the Opponent myself. Or that a machine could play it.
On the
other hand, it is possible to interpret our need of a dialog partner as
connected to our need of this look into the problem that we would never think
of, this view that changes the whole debate by adding new dimensions and new
requirements to it. Here the addressee is indispensable
as the other person, the one I cannot ever enclose in my thoughts.
Or maybe,
the sadness of Rabi Yohanan, realizing that Rech Laqich is not likely to be replaced,
relates to both aspects, without feeling any tension between them. Our dialog
partner counts at the same time as the co-intellectual who carries with us the
burden of logical exploration according to the rules, and as the unmasterable other person, who brings the unpredictable at
the semantic level.
I now come
to what I believe to be a well known debate, connected with a famous objection
of RicÏur to Levinas. RicÏur reads Levinas, and understands that for him, the
other person is infinite (she is the face, bearing an unlimited requirement
towards me). He therefore objects that the Infinite is not likely to be a
dialog partner. Our dialog partner should share finiteness with us. Which is
more, our dialog partner has to stand in a reciprocal relationship with us
(would it only be in order to understand that our I coincides with his Thou,
and vice versa): but for Levinas, the other person, remarks RicÏur, occupies
the Thou position beyond any possible
reciprocity. This point is even something that Levinas often underlines (for
example when he comments on Buber).
I have
heard that objection a lot of times: it has been, quite evidently, much
convincing and successful in the opinion of many readers. Still, I find the
objection misconstrued. But more importantly, there is something that we win if
we counter-object.
Levinas,
indeed, never claims that the other person is infinite, or equates with the
Infinite. Such statement would be an attempt to convert the other personÕs
status in the ontological framework. The other person does not deserve the
predication by the infinite, because this would contradict this kind of
ÒexperienceÓ of the Infinite that we find in the Òethical plotÓ. Here we could
even remark that, would it be the case that the other person ÒisÓ infinite,
then the statement, concerning a variable, would have universal value:
therefore I would be infinite myself as anyone, and dialog would have to happen
ÒbetweenÓ two infinites: whether it looks like possible or impossible, I donÕt
see very clearly. But let us be more serious, and try to come back to what
Levinas really means. He means that as far as I learn the original meaning of
ethics when facing the other person, she counts as infinite. It is not by
knowing the other person, or calculating her as standing in reciprocal formal
relationships with me, that I begin to understand ethics as what is incumbent
on me. But this is not to be translated as the acknowledgment of some
metaphysical equation of the other person with the infinite. Very clearly, the
other person stands like me in the finite area of accessible being, and I have
to locate myself at such material level in order to help her, as Levinas always
underlines. So, the important point is that Infinite only intervenes in LevinasÕs construction as some meaning component of the
ethical plot, some dimension of how I learn ethics, its stakes and its
obligatory character. Not as a positive permanent property of any subject,
having then to be coped with in some behavioral economy.
So much for the controversy. But, as I announced, there is more to draw
from the point. I now come to it, trying to address more intrinsically the
question of dialog at the same time. But this part of the work I will assume as
part of my personal philosophical program of etho-analysis. Which has to be explained.
Etho-analysis
is a kind of continuation of the phenomenological program, which aims at
describing the various sense regions
of human experience, as Husserlian phenomenology was
attempting to describe the various objects
region coming into consideration for consciousness, each of them correlated
with some intentional mode. We recognize that some sense region is going on
when we realize that some part of our experience keeps contact with the stakes
indicated by some special word, which I call a soliciter (sollicitant in French): such words, while being
nouns, cannot be correctly interpreted as designating a class of items in
reality, even of unorthodox items (of subjective or linguistic type for
example). I characterize them as ideality
words, because they stand more for something that should be than for
something that is. For example (one of the three examples that I consider in my
book Territoires du sens[5]), the word love does not refer to a class of loves (relational episodes) or of
being in love objects: we use it in current talk more in order to name what is
at stake, which perspective is relevant on whatÕs going on. Maybe we build a
lot of predicative sentences involving love, but the referential content is
never the relevant content. What the soliciter points at, is that we, human kind, try to keep
sense for love, and we do it at the global level of our lives. There is a whole
behavioural, linguistic and subjective network which warrants that we go on trying to have love
relationships, and evaluate how far we succeed in satisfying the corresponding
requirements. This setting I call the ethos
corresponding to the sense region
motivated by the soliciter.
To describe the sense region amounts to make what I call its sensance (sŽmance in French)
explicit: as Husserl suggests us to find, through the eidetic variation method,
the essence which specifies under
exactly which conditions some object of some considered region is received and
recognized as such, I try to find the prescriptionÕs bundle which governs the
truthful continuation of the sense region. There are ways of feeling, speaking
and acting that we have to follow as long as we wish to claim to be part to the
love tradition, to add one case to it. Sensance
simply enumerates these implicit commands.
Well, I
think that we have to regard dialog as a soliciter,
as more than a technical logical-linguistic term picking out from reality
speech sequences with alternate utterers. There are
some requirements for us to deserve being considered as going on with dialogÕs
tradition. But we have to try to be precise with these requirements, looking
for dialogÕs sensance.
Contrary to
what ontologically minded philosophers judge, what makes dialog authentically
dialog is not the formal sequence of speech acts, or the principled symmetry of
both speech positions. When some partner does not take into account the other
oneÕs speech, when he only says what he anyway wished to say, as we very often
witness in talk shows or interviews of personalities, and alas also in
philosophy conferences, we feel that dialog is damaged and corrupted, that no
genuine dialog any more happens.
We have
just identified here, I guess, the most basic requirement for dialog, quite
different of HabermasÕs rules or RicÏurÕs ontological
claim concerning reciprocity or symmetry: the requirement that what is said by
each partner is ÒsensitiveÓ to what he has heard. A
requirement of Òreceptive relaunchingÓ, to try to name it with suiting words.
Now at the
root of this receptive relaunching requirement, we find Infinity in LevinasÕs sense. It is only if IÕm able do deal ethically
at least with respect to what is said to me (even if not with respect with my
dialog partner), that IÕm able to relaunch the dialog in a careful and
receptive way, at each step. I need here some part of the ethical ability, some
dimension of the ethical relationship, the one which
makes me listen to the other personÕs
speech as teaching. I have to feel what the other person says as potentially
rich of some meaning that I do not already master in order to properly listen
to her or him, and in order to hold a genuine dialog with her or him.
So the perspective which associates Infinity with the other person,
involved in the ethical plot, is also needed for what I use to call the
Òsemantic plotÓ. And I may even add, coming back to RicÏurÕs criticism, that
ÒpositionalÓ infinity of the other person, concretely expressed as full
listening, is also requested for reciprocity. If we want meaning to be
reciprocally transmitted, we need each partner to listen: without listening,
alternation does not realize dialogÕs reciprocity. Positional infinity,
grounded in ethical relationship and warranting listening, has therefore to be
counted as a first feature of dialogÕs sensance, which proves at the same time
that LevinasÕs setting is better suited for dialog
than RicÏurÕs ontological one.
This would
be dialogÕs sensance first clause. But there is more to say, again related to infinity, as we are going to see. What we deeply
require for dialog to happen, as a matter of fact, is that every speech act
reacts to the previous one, is relative to it, has heard it, manifests a
Òthought moveÓ modified by what has been heard.
The
discussions about the Turing test have made this more familiar to us. We feel
reluctant to name dialog what happens when some partner, being a computer,
simply computes his answer on the basis of some formal external feature. We
have felt deceived when we have been told that the program Elisa was having a conversation with us. The ÒrelativenessÓ
condition was not really satisfied.
How could
we express this relativeness condition?
First, it
seems to me that such intention was, even if not on purpose, part of GriceÕs
work. We may understand that the Cooperative
Principle, and the various rules it gives rise to, define for him dialogÕs sensance: we are not following the
dialog tradition, unless we keep what we say inside the frontiers which these
rules define. So GriceÕs conception chooses to characterize dialogÕs sensance
by an enfolding finality, which specializes in a bunch of rules. Each of these
rules has its own way of being inexact (like Òbe perspicuousÓ: we have no easy criterion to decide
whether it is obeyed). But after all, this inexactness inherits from the
enfolding principle: it is difficult to judge whether someone is perspicuous
exactly insofar as it is difficult to judge whether someone is cooperative.
I think we
can explore this difficulty by commenting a discussion that Grice meets in one
of his papers. I jump directly to the point, by quoting some definition given
by Grice. The context, as I said some paragraphs before, is that Grice tries to
make clear what ÒU meant something by xÓ
means, x having not to be a linguistic
performance (it could also be a gesture or a face gesture). Grice improves his
definition step by step, each time taking into account some new picturesque
dialogical case. He reaches in that way following formulation :
Ç We can now formulate the general
form of these suggested conditions, the second redefinition, version A:
ÒU meant something by xÓ is
true iff U uttered x intending thereby
(1) that A should produce response r
(2) that A should, at least
partly on the basis of x, think that
U intended (1)
(3) that A should think
that U intended (2)
(4) that A's production
of r should be based (at least in
part) on A 's thought that U intended
that (1) (that is, on A's fulfillment of [2])
(5) that A should think
that U intended (4). È[6].
We may paraphrase this definition to make it more talkative. That ÒU meant
something by xÓ is understood to mean
that U was hoping some behavioral
response r. But A should not offer that response only under the influence of such
or such mechanical cause, he should produce r
because he read in x UÕs intention that he does so. And more,
he should not infer such an intention from x
as something that U was hiding in x, but rather he should conceive of his
reading such an intention as what U
himself intended. More, AÕs production
of r should arise in some sense or in
some way from the just described understanding of x. And finally, A should not imagine that the way he came to r reading the intention of U that he does so would escape in any
way to UÕs general perspective when
uttering x. Therefore we have to
posit that this understanding transition from A was also part of UÕs
intention.
Well, Grice
remarks that this definition shows a formal feature which opens up for an
infinite regression. To quote him again :
Ç A notable fact about this analysans is that at several points it exhibits the
following feature: U's nth "sub-intention" is
specified as an intention that A should think that U has his (n-l)th "sub-intention."
The presence of this feature has led to the suggestion that the analysis of
meaning (on these lines) is infinitely or indefinitely regressive, that further
counterexamples could always be found, however complex the suggested analysans, to force the incorporation of further clauses
which exhibit this feature È[7].
As a matter
of fact, we observe this formal feature, in the above quoted definition, three
times, with n=1 the first time, n=2 the second time and n=5 the third time. The idea is that if
what A does really comes from xÕs working as a message, then it should be considered as
incorporated in the message uttererÕs original
intention. But in that way, the meaning content of what is meant cannot be
stopped from indefinitely inflating.
Well Grice
discusses the point, wondering whether such regression is harmful, and whether
counterexamples forcing to add an additional clause are really to be
considered. I will not comment of his discussion of the problem, keeping
concentrated on what the very fact of considering this infinite regressionÕs
possibility reveals about meaning and dialog.
And I would
express things in following way. What GriceÕs point shows is that meaning, on
one side, has always to be judged and described as received meaning: what
something means corresponds to what can be understood by some addressee. This
is a very simple although very important point, which for example Dummett also makes in his famous papers about meaning, if
my memory is correct.
But we also
have a kind of reverse point: at least in GriceÕs view, we cannot receive
content as expressed meaningful content without giving credit of that meaning
to the utterer. If not, we enter another area: the
area of what has been imposed by us, taking the message not as message but as
favorable circumstance.
I think
Grice discovers, in his analysis and comment, some genuine clause of dialogÕs
ÒsensanceÓ. We do not connect ourselves to dialogÕs ethos, we do not go on with
the tradition of dialog, we do not assume the stakes of dialog if we donÕt
receive every speech act in a kind of Òvirtually infiniteÓ way. To take
seriously some phonological event as meaning performance means hearing it at
the level of what is asked in it and by it. If I switch to an objective
attitude and consider the message as objective data on the basis of which I
invent a semantic gesture, I do not practice dialog: to practice dialog, as we
said, is to say something that we claim to react to the message, to relaunch what was sent. Practicing dialog, we should never
utter anything that does not root in some asking haunting the message. So, in
dialog, we come to reciprocally credit ourselves of every possible meaning
layer. When I construe what I heard as asking something, I construe the utterer as having asked, I construe myself as answering, I
construe the message as enfolding my answer as asked by it, therefore I
construe in some sense the utterer as having already
waited for my transition from his message to answering, and so on, more or less
as Grice describes it, but also in a lot of other ways. As subtle as I may be
in deciphering words and phrases in the message I receive, I will be
Òsemantically arrogantÓ if I substitute my construal for what the message was
about, making it a closed finite set of semantic features, and I will be
considered in such case (by myself before all) as having stopped to listen: the
more I enrich the message by grasping asks in it, the more able I become to
raise further questions about what was precisely asked and how it was asked
beyond any picture of this ask I actually possess. To take a message as
addressed by someone in a dialog means that, it means that you are always
indebted to what you are been told and that you never stop trying to connect
yourself with Òsomething behindÓ, such attitude being your semantic commitment
to the dialog partner.
All this is
analogous with infinite responsibility towards the other inside the ethical
plot following Levinas, but it does not coincide with it: one may be a
wonderful dialog partner, making dialog more dialog than it was possible to
hope, without seriously welcoming the other at the ethical level. Because in
order to be truthful to the dialog requirement, I only have to construe always
more subject behind the message according to my reading and feeling the message
as asking: but the mediation of the message, in such context, is enough for
allowing me to forget of the other person absolutely taken, as face and urge
for help. Or to put it differently, the semantic game of dialog offers me some
avenue for escaping ethics by simulating it at the semantic level of construal.
Not to say that it is not part of ethical command to react in a dialogical way
to what is told to us. It is, and in some sense, we show sensitive to ethical
reign by obeying dialogsÕs sensance: more, we
initiate and favor ethical behavior in that way. But there is more than that in
ethical command. And at some level, to take part to ethical move means to be
able to discard any construal of the other, in order to help in a simpler and
more concrete way.
Our two
views of infinite as part of dialogÕs sensance meet and partly merge. As we
said commenting on RicÏurÕs objection, dialog requires that I take the other
personÕs speech as teaching, and that I bestow to my dialog partner some
infinite stature in that sense. But this in turn translates, in a kind of
technical way, as the requirement not to feel ever quits with some construal of
the otherÕs speech: and this requirement of dialogÕs sensance brings infinity
inside the game. It expresses the content of the requirement that what we say
counts as answer and not as free manipulation of the message.
I will just
try in this brief conclusion to draw some consequences of the just outlined etho-analysis of dialog, which brought to the fore infinity
as required for dialog to be dialog in two senses: for the addressee to count
as teaching master, and for the meaning content to be received as such without
any finiteness limit in construal.
First, this
double Òinfinity conditionÓ, because it grounds dialog as meaning exchange,
concerns the search fort truth as well as the search for good or justice.
When you
attempt at saying the best possible truth, you need any refinement or deepening
of the meaning of sentences or theories which are confronted with reality to be
available. In any possible epistemological conception of knowledge, you have to
acknowledge that progress in science comes very much from reshaping of
theories, of fundamental concepts: scientists have to re-elaborate and sharpen
their whole setting all the time, in order to ask better and new questions to
experience. But this amounts to working on the meaning of already given
theories and concepts, by trying to hear possible distinctions or
interpretations which have not been heard until now. And this in turn is what
happens if we always put ourselves in dialogical attitude with transmitted
knowledge, as we just saw. Which concretely goes through non metaphorical
dialog, through dialog between scientists and theorists: it is as meaning
addressed by one to the other that the transmitted meaning will get deepened
and improved, enlarged and modified.
Similarly,
when you attempt as formulating what good or goodness asks from us, or to make explicit
just laws for community, you have to go back to what has been traditionally
prescribed, and try to hear more in it, in order to satisfy requirements that
you meet in new situations connected to the law. You cannot take once for all
some finite interpretation of the meaning of the laws for granted. Therefore, again,
you need these laws to occur in living dialog, as addressed to you, and to
deepen what they say according to the dialog principle, enforcing you to
receive their meaning as meaning and not to capture some semantic image of
them.
For sure, all this Òinfinity patternÓ will as a matter of fact result
in finite construal, as well in the theoretical and in the ethical case. But
that Òmeaning in dialogÓ is ruled by what I call Infinity Principle is what ensures that we are never quits with the
available gloss.
Finally, as
a last word: we are allowed to define philosophy as the discipline in charge
with this Infinity Principle, as a method for respecting and cultivating
meaning as such, a method which therefore systematically attracts meaning into
dialog, in order to motivate the ethical gesture of hearing more. This could
be, after all, a way of understanding and justifying Plato, many centuries
after.
[1]. Cf. Grice, P., Studies in the Way of Words (from now on, SWW), Cambridge, London,
Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 32.
[2]. Cf. SWW, p. 26.
[3]. Cf. SWW, p. 137.
[4]. Cf. Hansel, G., De la Bible au Talmud, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2008, p. xxx-xxx.
[5]. Cf. Salanskis, J.-M., Territoires du sens, Paris, Vrin, 2007.
[6]. Cf. SWW, p. 96-97.
[7]. Cf. SWW, p. 96.